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Abstract: In recent years, the emerged network worms and attacks have distributive characteristic, 
which can spread globally in a very short time. Security management crossing network to co-defense 
network-wide attacks and improve efficiency of security administration is urgently needed. This paper 
proposes a hierarchical distributed network security management system (HD-NSMS), which can 
centrally manage security across networks. First describes the system in macrostructure and 
microstructure; then discusses three key problems when building HD-NSMS: device model, alert 
mechanism and emergency response mechanism; at last, describes the implementation of HD-NSMS. 
The paper is valuable for implementing NSMS in that it derives from a practical network security 
management system (NSMS). 
1 Introduction 
The earliest research on NSMS can be pursued back to the Europe project SAMSON [1] in 1992, 
which performs the security management by integrating interfaces of CMIP and SNMP. Scholars in the 
world discussed widely on NSMS in each subsequent year. In 1997, F. Stamatelopoulos etc. 
implemented an integrated network security management system on UNIX machine by adopting 
SNMP protocol and using architecture of Manager/Agent [2]. In 1998, Philip C. Hyland etc. proposed a 
three-stage theory for network security management and built a security management framework 
named CSSA [3]. In 1999, Soon Choul Kim etc. built a NSMS based on architecture of Client/Server 
[4], which collects security information from each computer, analysis them and displays results to users. 
Between 2000 and 2002, K. Boudaoud etc. discussed NSMS [5] from perspective of multi-agent, and 
built a prototype. But its main goal is to promote the ability of intrusion detection. In 2005, J. Dawkins 
etc. built a prototype of NSMS [6], which identifies, tracks and analyzes security events based on 
security information gotten from other detecting and scanning tools, and displays results to users in 
graph style. 
Above researches focus on single network security management, most of them didn’t involve 
cross network security management. However, requirement of security management crossing network 
is becoming more and more urgent lately. Because of that most of worms emerged in recent years have 
distributive characteristic, which can spread to worldwide in a very short time, and maybe derive from 
different networks and districts, these require extensive coordination in the procedure of tracing and 
defense. Cross network security management can meet the requirement well for that it is effective in 
defending network-wide attacks and managing security by the means of integrated management and 
cross-network cooperation when handling events, policies and vulnerabilities. 
In the period of 2004~2006, we implemented a HD-NSMS that can execute cross network 
management, and mainly included five main functions: status monitor, event management, policy 
management, vulnerability management and security situation evaluation. On basis of the practical 
research and development, section 2 of the paper describes the system in macrostructure and 
microstructure; section 3 discusses three key problems when building HD-NSMS: device model, alert 
mechanism and emergency response mechanism; section 4 describes the implementation of 
HD-NSMS. 
2 Architecture 
HD-NSMS is a complicated system, whose architecture has to be described from both macro level 
and micro level. 
2.1 Macro Architecture 
HD-NSMS aims at protecting network of large-scale organization, which has three characteristics 
in general: hierarchical, distributed and dendriform, it is 
shown in Figure 1. Correspondingly, HD-NSMS should 
have consistent macro architecture with organizational 
network structure in macro level. Therefore, HD-NSMS is 
composed of a number of nodes. Each node is named as 
“security management node”(SMN)，which is responsible 
for centralized security management in local network and its 
descendent networks. Corresponding to organization’s network, all of the SMNs construct a tree like 
structure. 
As there are notable differences between managing device and SMN, SMN can be divided into 
two classes: Intranet SMN (ISMN) and Extranet SMN (ESMN). ISMN manage device, and ESMN 
manage SMN. Hence, 
two kinds of macro 
architecture can be 
built: Macro 
Architecture 
combining ISMN 
and ESMN (see 
Figure 2), Macro 
Architecture separating ISMN and ESMN (see Figure 3). Device in this paper means security related 
equipments, hosts or software. Devices can be divided into three classes: security device, network 
device and important hosts. 
Under the macro architecture separating ISMN and ESMN，ISMN is responsible for the tasks 
related to device, such as monitoring running status of device, receiving and handling security events 
from device , acquiring security policy from device and enforcing policy to device. ESMN can fulfill 
security management in a larger network under the support of lower ISMN and ESMN, such as 
analyzing security events, computing security situation, and distributing security policies and patches 
etc. Although this architecture divides works of ISMN and ESMN clearly, the cost of developing and 
maintaining such kind of management system is high. Besides that, the whole system will be 
complicated for that it comprises two types of SMN. 
Under the merged architecture, there is only one type of SMN, which manages both device and 
SMN. As this architecture regards SMN as a special device, the structure of 
the HD-NSMS looks simple, and the cost of development and maintenance 
is low. Therefore, we choose the architecture combining ISMN and ESMN 
for our HD-NSMS. 
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Diversity is an important characteristic of NSMS, which includes platform diversity, device type 
diversity, manufacturer diversity and information structure diversity. How to merge all of these 
together and at the same time guarantee high performance, reliability, security and scalability of the 
system is not easy to resolve. The best way to resolve such problem is adopting method of layered 
abstraction. So, we abstract micro architecture of HD-NSMS into five-layer depicted in Figure 4.  
The ground layer is DIL (Device Interface Layer), which acquires and configures directly various 
data or files on device, masks differences and details of device operations and data derived from 
different manufacturers, and provides unified device operations and data interfaces for upper layer. 
The second layer is CCL (Common Communication Layer), which is responsible for 
communication between agents and SMN, between user console and SMN, and between SMN and 
SMN. This kind of communication includes communication in local network or across wide area 
network. Besides that, encryption, certification, speed control, reliability, priority control and time 
synchronization all are involved in. Providing unified communication interface to SMN, agent and user 
console is also concerned. 
The third layer is DLL (Device Logic Layer), which is responsible for maintaining device 
topology in SMN, masking some details such as device type or location etc, and providing more 
abstract device operations for upper layer. 
The fourth layer is FLL (Function Logic Layer), which helps to implement SMN functions of 
device status monitoring, events management, policy management, vulnerability management and 
security situation evaluation. 
The top layer is UIL (User Interface Level), which runs on user console. It interacts with users 
directly in graph style, and sends user commands and data to FLL. 
Table 1 describes the abstraction of each layer. 
Table 1. Five-layer structure 
Layer Function Main operations for upper layer Data for upper layer 
UIL Interacts with users Graph Interface Graph Interface 
FLL Implements device status 
monitoring, events 
management, policy 
management and security 
situation evaluation 
Send device status; send device event; 
query event; read/write device security 
policy; dispatch/receive patch; scan 
vulnerability; evaluate security 
situation; handle security event. 
Command parameters 
DLL Maintains device topology Build, assemble, disassemble, expand, 
and shrink device topology; read, 
write, search, add, delete, and modify 
device. 
Device No.  
CCL Communicates between 
agent and SMN, user 
console and SMN, SMN and 
SMN 
Send data; Receive data Communication data（decided 
by communication protocol）
DIL Manages device directly Read device status; read device log, 
receive device event; read/write device 
security policy; write device patch. 
Device running status, device 
events or log, device security 
policy, device patches 
Building NSMS based on the layered-abstraction idea has merits of that it can merge all devices of 
different types or from different manufactures together conveniently. It is also convenient to add new 
functions into NSMS. Moreover, the architecture is clear and 
east to maintain.  
The micro-architecture is built as Figure 5, which is divided 
into four independent parts: Security Management Node (SMN), 
Device Agent (DA), User Console (UC) and Common 
Communication Server (CCS). These four parts correspond to 
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above five-layer structure. 
DA is composed of Device Interface module and DA Kernel module. Both of them belong to DIL. 
Device Interface module communicates directly with device through several kinds of protocols, which 
includes SNMP, CMIP, syslog, manufacturer specific protocols, customed protocols or directly 
accessing. By these protocols, the module can complete operations of getting or setting device status, 
getting or setting device policy, etc. DA Kernel receives and explains commands from SMN, and 
performs required operations on device through device interface module. At the same time, it receives 
alerts and status information from device, transforms them into uniform formats and sends them to 
SMN through CCS. 
Common Communication is composed of communication library and CCS，and belongs to CCL. 
Communication library is attached to SMN, DA and UC，implements communication protocol stack, 
multi-threads parallelization and multi-level cache etc. CCS is an independently running program, 
mainly responsible for encryption/decryption, cross-network speed control, asynchronous storage and 
routing of communication. 
SMN is the kernel of HD-NSMS and is composed of Device Module and Function Module. 
Device Module belongs to DLL, it maintains devices’ logical topology, attaches device attributes for 
information sending out, explains device attributes for information receiving in. Function module 
belongs to FLL, performs functions of SMN, and manages parallel asynchronous information. Except 
of managing devices in local network, SMN also communicates with other SMNs, regards descendent 
SMN as its own devices, and regards itself as superior SMN’s device. 
UC Kernel and UI Module belong to UIL. They are responsible for user interaction. UI Module is 
a graphical interface. UC Kernel creates and sends user commands, receives and explains alert and 
status information, and maintains device topology in user view. 
3 Key Issues 
3.1 Device Model 
Device is the key object of HD-NSMS, and the five functions of HD-NSMS all are relative to 
device, so building reasonable device model is very important. The process of building device model is 
divided into three steps of addressing, abstraction and organization. 
3.1.1 Device Addressing 
HD-NSMS is a typical large-scale distributed communication system. Network communication is 
required between all device agents and SMN. Therefore, uniform addressing is necessary for 
identifying each communication node uniquely in whole HD-NSMS. 
The addressing method of HD-NSMS should satisfy two requirements: uniqueness and 
locatability. Uniqueness means identifying a node uniquely in the macro tree structure of HD-NSMS, 
even if two nodes are located in the same LAN or on the same machine; Locatability means the logical 
location of a node in the macro structure tree of HD-NSMS can be ascertained. In other words, the 
level, sub-tree or number of any node can be ascertained. 
For identifying a communication node, IP address is a typical example, which can identify a 
machine on the Internet uniquely. But, if HD-NSMS uses IP for identification, there will be some 
problems difficult to resolve: How to ascertain the logical position of a node in HD-NSMS’ macro 
structure tree by using IP address? How to differentiate each node while several communication nodes 
share one IP address? Hence, IP address isn’t appropriate for HD-NSMS addressing. 
We designed a new addressing method. It assumes n and d as depth and degree of HD-NSMS’ 
macro architecture tree, represents address of a node as following string: 
A1.A2.A3…. An              0≤Ai≤d  1≤i≤n 
The node address string is composed of several segments separated by dots. The amount of 
segments is equal to the depth or total levels of macro structure tree. Each segment describes number of 
the node under its parent node. For example, there is a node that has address as 1.2.4.0.0.0.0.0, which 
means the HD-NSMS has eight levels in total and this node is a 3rd level node. The number of this 
node in level 1 is 1, level 2 is 2, and level 3 is 4. The numbers below level 3 all are zero, which 
indicates level of the node is 3. This addressing method meets above two requirements well for that an 
address can represent a HD-NSMS node’s logical position and identify it uniquely. 
We illustrate HD-NSMS addressing method by using the network structure in Figure 1. Left part 
of figure 6 for merged macro architecture, right part for separated macro architecture. 
Obviously, all nodes in HD-NSMS construct a tree. Each node in the tree represents a device and 
has an address. We name such tree as Addressed Device Tree. In the Addressed Device Tree, there are 
only two kinds of nodes: SMN node and Device node. Only SMN node can be a non-leave node. 
For any node in Addressed Device Tree, the algorithm complexity of searching a node from the 
root is O (n), which n is depth of the node in the tree. In the case of numberless tree, the algorithm 
complexity should be O (n*d), which d is degree of the node. So Addressed Device Tree is efficient on 
performing operations of search, add and delete. 
3.1.2 Device Abstraction 
We abstract device both statically and dynamically. Static abstraction regards security device, 
network device, host machine and SMN as a uniform device object which has attributes of device type, 
operations and properties. Device object is the kernel data structure of the whole HD-NSMS, we 
describes it by UML in Figure 7. Firstly, we define a super class named Device, which includes basic 
information about device and related operations; then, define each specified device object which 
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Device
id: String            //device address
type: Integer         //device type 
name: String         //device name 
ip: String            //device IP 
port: Integer          //device port 
manufacturer:Integer //manufacturer number
parent: device         //parent device 
children: device[]      //children devices 
policyFilePath: String  //path of policy file 
……              //operations ignored
FWDevice 
state: FwState     //firewall running state 
event: FwEvent[]  //recent firewall events 
GetFwState()      //get firewall state 
HandlFwEvent()   //handle firewall event 
…… 
AVDevice 
state: AvState     //AV running state 
event: AvEvent[]  //recent virus events 
GetAvState() //get AV running state 
HandlAvEvent()    //handle virus event 
…… 
IDSDevice 
state: IdsState       //IDS running state 
event: IdsEvent[]    //recent IDS events 
GetIdsState()     //get IDS running state
HandlIdsEvent()    //handle IDS event 
…… 
HMDevice 
state: HMState  //HM running state 
event: HMEvent[]   //recent HM events 
GetHMState()  //get HM running state 
HandlHMEvent() //handle HM event 
…… 
SCADevice
state: ScaState     //scanner running state 
GetScaState()      //get state of scanner 
GetScaReport()    //get report of scanner 
HandlScaReport()//handle report of scanner 
SMNDevice
state: SmnState       //SMN running state 
event: SmnEvent[]//recently received events 
GetSmnState()    //get SMN running state 
HandlSmnEvent()  //handle received event 
…… 
Fig.7. Static abstraction of devices
includes attributes of device’ running status, latest events list and corresponding handling functions. 
Specific device object involves FWDevice, IDSDevice, AVDevice, SCADevice, HMDevice and 
SMNDevice. 
In addition, for abstracting device dynamically, we 
describe a state transition diagram that contains ten 
statuses and twelve transfer conditions as shown in Figure 
8. Ten status that pictured as nested circles include offline 
(S1); network disconnected (S11); device can’t arrive 
(S12); online (S2); waiting (S21); running normally 
(S211); running abnormally (S212); handling alert (S22); 
handling policy (S23); handling vulnerability (S24). Twelve transfer conditions include receiving 
network test package (T1); overtime when waiting network test package (T2); receiving device state 
package (T3); overtime when waiting device state package (T4); device abnormity of CPU, memory, 
disk, network flow or key process (T5); device normality of CPU, memory, disk, network flow or key 
process (T6); receiving device alert (T7); finishing handling alert (T8); receiving policy handling 
command (T9); finishing handling policy command (T10); receiving vulnerability handling command 
(T11); finishing handling vulnerability command (T12). 
3.1.3 Device Organization 
Device organization should reflect topology of physical devices in reality, and convenient for 
perform any computation. Besides, device organization should be displayed in visualized way for users 
to understand and operate. Therefore, we propose a three mapping model for device organization: 
physical view, virtual view and user view. 
 Physical View: a device topology that describes how the physical devices are connected in reality. 
 Virtual View: a mapping of the physical view in memory. It also can be regarded as a topology of 
abstracted device objects. A device in virtual view is a logical abstraction of the corresponding 
physical device. Virtual view is the kernel of three layers and computational foundation for five 
functions of HD-NSMS. 
 User View: a mapping of virtual view on user interface. It also shows the result of user operation. 
Devices in user view are different from those in virtual view. User View describes position, size, 
icon, alert and sounds of device objects in user interface. It not only can map virtual view, but also 
can modify virtual view in return. 
Essentially, virtual view and user view are Addressed Device Tree composed of abstract devices. 
Virtual view and user view have to change dynamically for mapping updates of physical device or 
making user operation conveniently. Possible changes in virtual view include: building, assembling and 
disassembling tree, adding and deleting device, modifying and switching status. Possible changes in 
user view include: building, destroying, assembling, disassembling, expanding and shrinking tree; 
adding and deleting device; modifying and switching status. Before introducing the algorithm of 
dynamical changing, two concepts need to be defined: 
Device Tree’s Embedding Structure: a data structure for encapsulating Addressed Device Tree, 
used in transmitting the Addressed Device Tree between virtual view and user view, and between upper 
SMN and lower SMN. Device tree’s embedding structure and Addressed Device Tree can convert 
reciprocally. It describes each device in following format: 
[DeviceId:DeviceState:Child1:Child2:Child3……] 
Then, the device tree in left of Figure 6 can be represented as: 
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View Mapping Thread: a 
daemon thread running on 
SMN and UC. Under the help 
of Device Tree’s Embedding 
Structure, it may implement 
mapping between virtual view and user view, which is illustrated in Figure 9. 
For an administrator of SMN, he/she only knows number, status and other information of direct 
subordinate devices. It is difficult for him/her to fill the information of indirect subordinate devices, 
because indirect subordinate devices maybe locate in remote place geographically. Therefore, we 
introduce assembling and disassembling algorithms to update automatically of subordinate device tree. 
Assembling algorithm can assemble the device tree’s embedding structure under the main tree and 
update the mapping onto user view. The assembling algorithm is given out as Figure 10. If subordinate 
SMN doesn’t send information for a long time, it is considered offline or network failure. At this time, 
its subordinate sub-tree should be disassembled. The disassembling algorithm is given out as Figure 11. 
3.2 Alert Mechanism 
Objective of alert mechanism is integrating events 
and disclosing relations among events. In recent years, 
a lot of research has been done in this field [9~13], but 
most of them keep eyes on intrusion detection and 
doesn’t involve relation analysis across different type 
of devices. Generally, they don’t treat differently on 
events from different type of devices and seldom 
Device tree’s 
embedding structure
Virtual view User view
SMN UC
Mapping thread Mapping thread 
Fig.9. View mapping mechanism 
Assembling algorithm:  
Parameter: device tree’s embedding structure 
1) call algorithm of building tree to transform device tree’s embedding 
structure to a subtree preparing for assembling; 
2) search in main tree the assembling node that is the same as root node 
of the subtree; 
3) add root node of the subtree into children device group of parent 
node of the assembling node; 
4) set parent of the assembling node as parent of root node of the 
subtree; 
5) delete the assembling node from its parent’s children device group; 
6) free the assembling node in virtual view; 
7) send new device tree to user view by mapping thread; 
8) find assembling node in main tree of the user view; 
9) update state of the assembling node according to root node of the 
subtree; 
10) by using an search algorithm of depth precedence, add every node of 
subtree circularly under the assembling node in user view; 
11) update user view; 
Main 
subtree 
Assembling node 
Virtual tree Assembling result
Virtual view User view 
Main tree 
Assembling node 
Fig.10. Assembling algorithm 
Disassembling algorithm: 
Parameter: disassembling node 
1) find the disassembling node in main tree of virtual view; 
2) modify state of the disassembling node; 
3) by using an search algorithm of depth precedence, delete every 
descendent nodes of the disassembling node; 
4) send new device tree to user view by mapping thread; 
5) find the disassembling node in main tree of user view; 
6) update state of the disassembling node in user view; 
7) by using an search algorithm of depth precedence, delete circularly 
every descendent node of the disassembling node; 
8)update user view; 
Main tree
subtree
Disassembling node
Disassembling result
Virtual view User view 
Disassembling node
Fig.11.Disassembling algorithm
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associate the events based on inner relationship of events from different type of devices. Cross-device 
event-association is an inevitable problem that has to be solved for building HD-NSMS. Our alert 
mechanism is described in Figure 12. 
DA accomplishes single-device event handling. Filter module of DA removes useless events 
coming from Firewall, IDS and Host Monitor etc. Even in the case of no attacks happen useless events 
may be generated largely, paper [15] proves this, so filtering is necessary. Single device aggregation 
module merges repeated events, ports scanning events, host monitoring events and DOS events. The 
normalization module converts each device event into a uniform XML format satisfying the 
requirements of IDMEF，and prepares to cross-device aggregation. 
SMN accomplishes cross-device event handling. Validation module of SMN rates normalized 
events that received from DA and filters the lowest events, rating event lies on value loss computed 
from value and vulnerabilities of information asset who is attack target of the event. Based on the event 
normalization, cross-device aggregating module aggregates events from multiple types of devices by 
uses a similarity function that has the form as in paper [16]. Session association module associates 
events belonged to the same network session into a session alert, and send the alert to UC. 
Session alert means aggregation of all related events during one network connection. These events 
surely belong to one attack and have strong relation between each other. Session alert is composed of 
session information and event queue. Session information mainly describes the source and destination 
address, start and stop time of the session. Events queue means events sorted by time and is useful for 
administrator to analyze the attacker’s intention. 
The key to build session alert is finding the events of connection and disconnection. The events 
can be sort out from firewall logs as the reason of that firewall monitors all kinds of connections, which 
surely contains connections of attack. For connection-oriented protocols, we can easily get connection 
and disconnection events; for non-connection-oriented protocols, we also can get the events in that 
most firewalls support stateful-inspection technology who can treat non-connection-oriented protocol 
as having connection [14].  
Each session alert has a session alert object in SMN memory, the object has an internal event 
queue, and the session alert is generated from the first non-connection event and destroyed when the 
connection is closed. At the same time, there is a global event queue for recording beginning time of 
each connection. Left of following describes session association algorithm, and right of following is an 
algorithm that deciding whether an event belongs to a session alert. 
Input: event 
Output: void 
If(received event of building connection) 
save the event into the global event queue of building connection; 
If(received event of non-connection){ 
search all of session alert objects; 
If(corresponding session alert don’t exist){ 
search in the global event queue of building connection; 
If(corresponding event of building connection exist){ 
build a new session alert object; 
initiate the alert object according to the event; 
build a new event queue; 
destroy the event of building connection; 
}else{ 
regards the event as an independent session alert; 
send alert ending information to UC, database or upper SMN;
clean the session alert and its event queue; 
return； 
} 
} 
append the event to event queue of the corresponding session alert;
send the session alert to UC or database; 
} 
If(received event of disconnection){ 
If(corresponding session alert exist){ 
write time of connection ending into session alert; 
send alert ending information to UC, database or upper SMN; 
set a destroyng flag on session alert for destroying the alert after 
a while; 
}else{ 
search in the global event queue of building connection; 
If(corresponding event of building connection exist) 
destroy the event of building connection; 
} 
} 
Return； 
Input: event and session alert 
Output:the event whether belongs to the session alert 
If((source and target address of the event both is the same as the 
session alert)or(source address of the event is the same as target 
address of the session alert)) 
If( event time is after connection building event of the session alert)
If(event time is before disconnection event of the session alert) 
Return(the event belongs to the alert) 
search in event queue of the session alert 
if(source address of the event is the same as target address of certain 
event of the session alert) 
If(event time is after building connection event of the session alert)
If(event time is before disconnection event of the session alert) 
Return(the event belong to the alert); 
Return(the event doesn’t belong to the alert); 
 
Session alert supported event association mechanism has several advantages. First, it can complete 
association in real-time as a result of that association operation is done in memory and searching queue 
is short; Second, it uses network session as unit to cluster events instead of usual time window, because 
of that the events belonged to the same session have more tight relationships with each other than the 
events belonged to the same time window; Third, it is easy to find out in-progress attack for that the 
session alert not ended indicates a in-progress attack; Fourth, it is easy to linkage with firewall by 
session information. 
3.3 Emergency Response Mechanism 
At present, handling security emergency mostly depends on manual operation, so it imminently 
needs an automatic or semi-automatic mechanism. We design a semi-automatic emergency handling 
mechanism for HD-NSMS, and the mechanism synthesizes three factors of flow, counterplan and 
cooperation. 
Flow means that the whole emergency response progress should comply with some normative 
flow. We design the emergency response flow in accordance with FCC drew Computer Security 
Incident Response Guide [8], which divides emergency response flow into six steps: Preparation, 
Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery and Follow-up. The steps of Preparation and 
Follow-up are not included in HD-NSMS by reason that these two steps are minor in handling 
emergency. 
Counterplan is a document that is written beforehand and saved in database, and it is used to guide 
event handling. Every event is associated with a counterplan. Counterplan consists of four 
sub-counterplans of identification, containment, eradication and recovery, which in accordance with the 
main four steps of emergency response flow. When administrator launches emergency response flow, 
HD-NSMS automatically sorts out corresponding counterplan and displays it to user interface. 
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Cooperation means that HD-NSMS provides a mechanism for entire network’s SMN nodes to 
treat together important security event. For the local network that security incident occurred in, its 
SMN is the main participant for event handling. As the higher-level network administrator usually has 
better experience in security, he/she is regarded as the coordinator in whole handling progress. For 
wide range attacks or worms, HD-NSMS adopted other SMN into handling progress to implement 
cooperative defense. We use UML to describe the handling progress in Figure 13. 
4 Implementation 
From 2004 to 2006, based on the previously described system structure, device model, alert 
mechanism and emergency response mechanism, we achieved an HD-NSMS system. Figure 14 depicts 
the hierarchical subsystems dependent relationship by method of UML. It ignores tool classes, 
supporting function classes and thread classes. Its layers basically correspond to the modules in Figure 
5 that depicts microstructure of HD-NSMS. 
DAKernel Layer and DevInt Layer correspond to the “DA Kernel” and “Device Interface” 
modules in Figure 5. DAEvent module in DAKernel Layer is responsible for filtering, single-device 
aggregating and normalizing event. 
CommCom Layer corresponds to the “Common Communication” module in Figure 5, and 
performs communications between SMNs and DAs. 
DBInt Layer provides unified DB operations for other modules. 
DevTopo Layer corresponds to the “Device Modules” in Figure 5. Five subsystems of IDSDevice, 
FWDevice, AVDevice, ScannerDevice and HMDevice manage respectively five types device of IDS, 
firewall, anti-virus, scanner and host-monitoring system. SMN is abstracted as device object and 
managed by SMNDevice module. DeviceManager is the external interface of DevTopo Layer, and 
implements maintenance operations on logic topology of devices. 
Fig.14. HD-NSMS implementation depicted by UML
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Function layer corresponds to the “Function Modules” in Figure 5. Five subsystems of State, 
Event, Policy, Vulnerability 
and Assessment archive 
respectively five functions of 
HD-NSMS. HandleLib 
module handles 
asynchronously the input 
packages. SessionManager 
module manages session 
queue and runs session 
monitoring thread. Event 
module is responsible for 
verifying, cross-device 
aggregating, associating and 
handling events, and 
implements the emergency 
response mechanism. 
UI Layer and UIKernel Layer correspond to the “UI Modules” and “UC Kernel” module in Figure 
5. Figure 15 shows a device topology in User Console of HD-NSMS.  
 
5 Related Work 
Compare to the related works [1~6], this paper innovatively builds a hierarchical distributed 
NSMS that can manage security in a Hierarchical distributed network. Though, there are several kinds 
of NSMS architectures, such as Manager/Agent [2], Client/Server [4] and Multi-Agent [5], they mainly 
focus on single-network security management, they can’t manage policy, event or vulnerability in a 
cross-network environment. If having interest, please also read our other papers [32]-[71]. 
 
6 Conclusion 
We promote architecture of HD-NSMS, and discuss three key problems in building HD-NSMS, 
which are device model, alert mechanism and emergency response. We describe the architecture from 
macrostructure and microstructure. Macrostructure has two kinds which both have advantages and 
disadvantages, one is ISMN and ESMN combined architecture; another is ISMN and ESMN separated 
architecture. Microstructure is divided into five layers: user interface, function logic, device logic, 
common communication and device interface. This layered architecture can screen differences among 
device types, manufacturers, or data structures, and provide a unified security management interface to 
administrator. Using this five layers architecture, we can build a HD-NSMS that has good performance, 
dependability and extensibility. 
As device is kernel object of a NSMS, we build a device model from respects of identifying, 
abstracting and organizing. For identifying device, we design a device addressing method that codes 
device address in a string, which composed of several numbers and separated by dot. For abstracting 
device, we use UML to describe abstracted device objects, and depict state transition diagram of 
abstractive device object. For organizing device, we promote a three level mapping model that contains 
physical view, virtual view and user view, physical view is a topology graph of physical devices; 
Fig.15. Devices topology in User Console 
virtual view is mapped from physical view and exists in main memory; user view is mapped from 
virtual view and exists in GUI. In order to build the virtual view and user view of whole network in real 
time, we depict assembling algorithm that add devices of lower level network into the views, and depict 
disassembling algorithm that clean devices of lower level network from the views. 
For alert mechanism, we promote a new event-association method based on session alert. We 
cluster all alerts that related to the same network connection into a session alert, because these events 
surely belong to the same attack, and can help administrator to analyze attack intent. The beginning and 
ending time of the network connection can be identified by the firewall event of building and 
destroying connection. Compare to paper [9] and [11], event-association method of this paper considers 
internal relations among events that generated from different types of devices, i.e. relation among 
firewall event and other device’s event. Compare to paper [10], the associating method of this paper 
can do associating work in real time. 
As currently people often do cross-network emergency response manually, we build a 
semi-automatic mechanism for cross-network emergency response. The mechanism considers three 
factors of emergency handing flow, counterplan and cooperative operation, can be used by 
administrators on different locations to cooperatively handle emergency. 
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